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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

LOlJIS \V. COOPER

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE INDUSrfRIAL CO~IMISSION
OF UT:\H, J\1:-\RCUS PLUJ\IBING
.\ND HEATING, and THE STATE
INSURANCE FUND,

Case No.
9931

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
\Ve agree \Vith that part of the Statement of Facts
contained in the first paragraph of Plaintiff's Brief (P .B.
2. 3). \ Ve are not, however, in complete agreement with
the remainder of the Statement of Facts as given by the
Plaintiff, and we, therefore, desire to restate the facts as
follows:
Plaintiff \\·as employed by Marcus W. Johnson
Plumbing and Heating as a laborer at Moab, Utah, on
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November 21, 1961. (R. 1) On that day Plaintiff was
doing the same kind of laboring work as he had done
day in and day out, which consisted of manual labor
in the handling and laying of sewer pipe. (R. 23-29)
Plaintiff testified that he was lifting on one end of a piece
of steel pipe. Two men were on the other end of the
pipe which they were lifting over a pile of pipe. (R. 13)
While he was lifting, Plaintiff got a catch in his back.
He let the pipe down and "got another hold on it" and
then continued to work. (R. 13) The catch was not
disabling, as the Plaintiff was able to continue with his
employment. (R. 13) He did not say anything at that
time about having injured himself to Steven L. Kay, the
foreman on the job. (R. 22) Nothing was said to Mr.
Kay until the latter went to the Plaintiff's home to see
why he did not report to work. This was after the second
injury claimed by the Plaintiff. (R. 22-23) He continued
working until the Thanksgiving holiday. (R. 14) After
the holidays he worked for an addiitonal one or two
days. At that time he was assisting with the setting of a
length of concrete pipe. ( R. 14) The Plaintiff on the
second occasion was only guiding the pipe into place.
(R. 17) The only injury sustained by him on this occasion
was that the ends of his fingers were scraped, bringing
blood to the surface. (R. 17) No other injury was
claimed for that occasion.
At the time Plaintiff claims he was lifting the pipe
on November 21st, he did not complain about pain in
his groin. (R. 13) Five or six days later as he was taking
a shower he found that his testicle had drawn up on
him. ( R. 14) Plaintiff had suffered from prostate trouble,
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cirrhosis of the liver, hemorrhoids and diabetes. (R. 1819.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not sustain
an accidental injury which was the cause of the Plaintiff's hernia.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT
HE SUSTAINED AN INJURY WHICH AROSE
OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.

Plaintiff argues through his counsel that he has established that an accident did arise out of and in the
course of his employment. We submit that the facts do
not support such a conclusion.
Plaintiff claims that he sustained a hernia by reason
of an accident occuring November 21, 1961. (R. 8)
There is the additional claim that at the same time he
sustained a back injury. This claim apparently was not
pressed as the record seems to primarily concern the
claim that Plaintiff sustained a hernia on said date.
There is very little testimony relative to the back condition.
Plaintiff did not complain about having injured his
back or groin on the occasion he and a companion were
guiding a small concrete pipe into place. (R. 17) This
occured after the Thanksgiving holiday. This injury involved only the tearing of some skin from his hands or
fingers.
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If the Plaintiff had suffered a hernia as he was
lifting one end of the corrugated pipe, ( R. 13), it \vould
be logical to assume that Plaintiff would have noticed
this physical ailment or condition at that time rather
than five days later. The normal traumatic hernia is
associated with nausea, inability to continue to work,
and pain in the area affected. None of these elements of
a compensable traumatic hernia were present on November 21, 1961, as far as the evidence appears in the
record. Plaintiff did not find it necessary to discontinue
work. He did not report his claimed in jury to his foreman, Steven L. Kay (R. 22) although Kay was working
nearby.
The first indication that the Plaintiff had of a hernia
was after he had worked two days following the Thanksgiving holiday. It was while taking a shower that he
found he was having difficulty. (R. 14)
The Plaintiff's case is weak because his testimony
is not supported by the testimony of other employees,
who were present at the time. According to Plaintiff's
testimony ( R. 13) two men were on the other end of
the corrugated pipe which Plaintiff claims he was lifting
when he was injured. Neither of these fellow employees
were called as witnesses. This would have been a simple
and direct way to substantiate the claim.
The Commission has the opportunity of seeing the
witnesses and evaluating their testimony. The Court in
john G. Hendrie Company vs. Industrial Commission 12
Utah 2d 80, 362 P2d 752, at page 81 said,
". . . that of believing the facts as related
by the applicant widow and her witnesses. This
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is a prerogative reserved to the Comission, with
\vhich \\"e do not interfere short of arbitrary action
not based on competent, believable evidence.''
Plaintiff was doing his regular work on September
21, and again on the days he worked following the
Thanksgiving holiday. On examination by the Referee,
(R. 28 and 29) the following questions and answers
.
were gtven.
By the Referee,

Q. Was the work that you were doing on the
21st day of November about the same type of
work you were doing day in and day out?
A. Yes, I have done mostly labor.

Q. I mean handling pipe like you did on that
day?
A. Yes. We have had a lot of heavier pipe
than that, as far as that goes."
The Plaintiff did not testify as to anything unusual
having occured. There was no slipping, falling or stumbling. Taking the testimony of Plaintiff at face value, all
that can be said of it is that Plaintiff was doing the
same that he had done each day, "day in and day out."
This is not an accident.
Plaintiff had physical ailments not related to his
employment, cirrhosis of the liver, prostate trouble, (R.
18-19) and "a 6th lumbar verterbra or a lumbralization
of the first sacral vertebra." (R. 5) Dr. Morrow, in his
report (R. 5) indicated that the back pain was of a
minor nature and that there was no disc involvement.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

In Smith vs. Industrial Commission 104 Utah 318,
140 P2d 314, the court in considering the claim of Smith
that he had suffered a hernia while he was working
alone, and which alleged injury he did not report to his
employer, said at page 323, the following,
"The weakness of Plaintiff's case is that there
is no evidence other than his own testimony that
he had an accident, or the details of effects thereof, and he is an interested witness. By the nature
of the accident it is impossible to contradict his
testimony. Such a situation presents an opportunity for imposition. A person who discovers he
has a hernia can readily make up details of a
story which would prove that it was caused by
an accident in the course of his employment. Under such circumstances he would naturally tell
that it occured while he was alone, he would
describe the usual symptoms when a hernia is
caused and would make a plausible explanation
of why he did not report it sooner. The person
making such a fabrication can do so knowing that
no one can directly contradict his testimony. Under these circumstances would it be unreasonable
for the commission to refuse to believe his story?
"This question must be answered in the negative. Everyone recognizes that an interested witness is not entitled to as much credibility as one
who is not interested.''
The evidence clearly shows that Plaintiff did not find
it necessary to stop work following the lifting incident
of September 21st. There is no claim that he sustained
a hernia because of the second event where Plaintiff
scraped his fingers. Plaintiff did not seek medical atten-
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tion immediately following the alleged lifting incident
of September 21st. He did not report to his foreman.
He was able to continue work. The fello\v employees who
Pia in tiff claims were assisting with the lifting of the pipe,
and who might have substantiated Plaintiff's claim, if it
were true, did not testify.
We submit that Plaintiff did not sustain the burden
of proof necessary to substantiate his claim that he sustained an injury arising out of or in the course of his
employment.
Inasmuch as considerable space in plaintiff's brief
(P.B. 8-14) is devoted to an attempt to show that the
evidence presented by the Plaintiff at the hearing is sufficient to meet the tests set forth in Norris vs. Industrial
Commission 90 Utah 256, 91 P2d 413, which would
compel the court to hold that the Commission erred in
its findings, we feel that a further discussion of that
case and its applicability to the case now before the
court is indica ted.
To hold that the present case comes within the rule
of the Norris case, it must be shown that as a matter of
law the wrong conclusion was reached from the evidence
presented. In contradiction to the argument of the Plaintiff, we do not believe that the evidence meets the requirements of the Norris test.
That case restates the well supported principle that
it is for the Commission to resolve conflicts in the evidence, for at page 415 Utah Report, the court said:
"Again, therefore, we have the old case of a
conflict of evidence which it is for the Commission to resolve."
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That case has been cited repeatedly by this Court as
authority to sustain the findings and orders of the Industrial Commission.
We will discuss the Norris tests as we see them applied to the testimony presented at the hearing before
the Industrial Commission.
(a) "The evidence must be uncontradicted."
The fact that Plaintiff did not mention the claimed
injury to his foreman; ( R. 22) that he was able to continue work; (R. 13) and that the hernia was not discovered by plaintiff for several days after the 21st of
September contradicts Plaintiff's testimony that he sustained a hernia on September 21st.
(b) There must be nothing in the record
which is intrinsically discrediting to the uncontradicted testimony."
Had Plaintiff sustained a traumatic hernia as claimed
he would have felt pain, from the tearing of the tissues.
It is not reasonable to suppose that he would have been
able to continue with his work.
(c) "The uncontradicted evidence must not
be wholly that of interested witnesses and if from
noninterested 'vitnesses the record must show no
bias or prejudice on the part of such witnesses."
The testimony of Steven L. Kay and Edward L. Neff
does not sustain Plaintiff's testimony as they did not see
what occured at the time of the Plaintiff's alleged "accident." The fellow employees who might have supported
Plaintiff's testimony did not testify.
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The case of Dole vs. Industrial Commission 115 Utah
311, 204 P2d 462 is cited as holding that the rule requir
ing that the uncontradicted evidence must not be wholly
that of interested witnesses has been relaxed.
The Dole case involved the claim of Dole, who was
driving a truck to the Kearns Army Base, when the
truck hit a rough spot in the road, causing it to bounce
and to go temporarily out of control. When the truck
righted itself, and the Plaintiff had recovered control,
he discovered that the vision in his right eye was blurred
and that he could not see clearly.
The next morning Dole reported to his doctor. In
the course of events, the claimant saw three doctors.
The first doctor claimed that he could not remember
the history as given by the Plaintiff. Dr. White, who
later saw the claimant stated that he was given the
details concerning the accident. A Seattle doctor, who
later operated also confirmed the history. The Commission held against the claimant, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Commission and referred it
back to the Commission for action not inconsistent with
the opinion.
The Dole can be distinguished from the instant case
in that there was a clear accident, and in that Dole immediately after the accident found that his eye was
blurred. Dole went to a doctor immediately in an effort
to find out what was wrong with his eye.
In the present case nothing unusual happened, and
the Plaintiff did not discover his hernia for five or six
days later. Plaintiff did not go to a doctor until several
days had passed.
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It is also important to note that there was a strong
dissent in this case. The decision was three to two. Chief
Justice Pratt and Justice Wolfe concluded that there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the conclusion of the Com-

. .

miSSIOn.

(d) "The uncontradicted evidence is such as
to carry a measure of conviction to the reasonable
mind and sustain the burden of proof."
We cannot agree that the evidence presents a "Plausible and not unusual occurence." We believe that the
actions of the Plaintiff would have been decidedly different had he sustained a traumatic hernia.
(e) "The uncontradicted evidence precludes
any other explanation or hypothesis as being
more or equally as reasonable."
The Plaintiff's testimony showed that he was doing
no more than usual work. There was no unusual incident
or accident. (R. 28-29) The probable explanation is
that Plaintiff's condition was one of long standing.
(f) "There must be no indication in the record that the presence of the witnesses gave the
Commission such an advantage that its conclusions should not be disturbed for that reason."
Certainly in this as in all cases, the trier of the fact
had the opportunity to see the witness and evaluate his
testimony.
We do not believe that Norris tests were met by the
testimony presented, nor that the Plaintiff by the evi-
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dence presented established that he sustained an injury
arising out of or in the course of his employment.
POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT
ACT ARBITRARILY OR UNREASONABLY IN
NOT REFERRING THE CLAIM TO A MEDICAL
PANEL.

We must agree with the statement in Plaintiff's brief
that the "Plaintiff must establish that he was injured"
by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment ( P .B. page 6) . We cannot agree to the conclusion
reached thereafter.
It is argued that inasmuch as medical testimony was
not allowed at the hearing of the matter before the Commission that Plaintiff was not permitted to fully present
his case.
Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, says:
"Every employee . . . who is injured . . . by
accident arising out of or in the course of his employment, . . . shall be entitled to receive and
shall be paid such compensation.... "
The Commission must first determine if there was
an accident within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. If the Commission should find after
hearing the testimony of the Applicant and any other
\vitnesses who might be called to testify that no "accident" had occured then it is not necessary to refer the
medical aspects of the case to a Medical Panel for to
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do so would be a useless thing. If there has been a determination that there has not been an accident the primary leg of a successful claim has collapsed.
The Commission after hearing the evidence, found:
"Applicant was performing the same type of
work on the day of the alleged injury as he had
performed day in and day out prior to November
21, 1961. He was doing nothing unusual. The
mere occurence of pain during the hours of employment and on the premises is not an accident.
Applicant must prove by at least a preponderence
of evidence, that something unusual, other than
occurence of pain took place. Applicant's work
was not unusual." (R. 30)
Plaintiff's contention that he has not been given a
fair hearing because there was no medical testimony
given falls on another ground, which is that Plaintiff did
testify as to the medical aspects of the case when he
testified that his "right testicle had drawn up inside
him" (R. 19), and that he had received a "catch" and
had to lower the pipe. ( R. 13) This testimony was sufficient to advise the Industrial Commission of the nature
of Plaintiff's complaint.
The file of the Commission also contained the Surgical Report of Doctor R. R. Rutt, (R. 2) and the report
of Doctor Robert E. Morrow. (R. 5-6) Certainly these
reports fully informed the commission of the medical
aspects of the claim. There was no dispute as to whether
or not Plaintiff had a hernia. No further offer of medical
evidence was made by the Plaintiff. See the reecnt Utah
Case of Pearl A. Long, wife of William T. Long, de-
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ceasfd vs. H'cJtern .\'tates Refining Company, et al. No.
9867, filed September 16, 1~)63.
I lad the Commission found after the hearing that

there \Vas an accident arising out of and in the course
of the Plaintiff's employment, then had there been controverted medical questions it would have been proper
and necessary for the Commission to refer the claim to
a l\fcdical Panel for the purpose of determining whether,
from the medical aspects of the case, the "accident'~
found by the Commission was the cause of or contributed
to the Plaintiff's physical condition.
Section 35-1-77 U.C.A. 1953 as amended begins as
follows:
"Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for in jury by accident, or for death, arising
out of or in the course of employment, and where
the employer or insurance carrier denies liability,
the Commission shall refer the medical aspects of
the case to a medical panel appointed by the
Commtsston ....
0

0

,,

We submit that undoubtedly the legislative intent
\vas that if there were any controversial medical questions involved then the matter should be referred to a
~fedical Panel. The Commission having found that the
Plaintiff had not sustained an accidental injury within
the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act it was
not necessary for the file to be referred to a panel of
medical doctors.
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POINT III
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACTS ARE CONCLUSIVE AND FINAL.
It is the duty of the Industrial Commission to make
findings of fact and conclusons of law. These duties are
clearly set out in the Workmen's Compensation Act of
our State.
Section 35-1-85 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads:
"After each formal hearing, it shall be the
duty of the Commission to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law in writing and file the
same with its secretary. The findings and conclusions of the Commission on questions of fact shall
be conclusive and final and shall not be subject
to review; such questions of fact shall include
ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions
of the Commission."
This question has been ruled upon many times by
this court. In the case of Norris vs. Industrial Commis·
sion, 90 Utah 256, 61 P2d 413, the Court restated the
well supported rule that it is for the Commission to
resolve conflicts in the evidence and to be the final
arbiter in the facts. The Court's opinion contains the
following at page 260.
"Again, therefore, we have the old case of a
conflict of evidence which it is for the Commission
to resolve."*****
The legislature, has in effect, said :
"The Commission is the final Arbiter of the
facts. If there is error in judgment or conclusions
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of or from the facts, it must be the Commission's
error and remain there. We give the Supreme
Court the right to speak only by warrant of law
in compensation cases when it speaks in reference
to errors of law alleged to have been made by
the Commission.''

In the case of Park Uath Consolidated Mines Company vs. The Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 481, 36
P2d 972, the Court said in part at page 488 :
". . . in the determining of facts the conclusions of the Commission are like a verdict of a
jury, and will not be interfered with by this Court
when supported by some substantial evidence."
In the case of Holland vs. Industrial Commission of
Utah, 5 Utah 2nd 105, 297 P2d, 230, this Court said at
page 106,
". . . the Commission was not obliged to believe this testimony. Smith v. Industrial Commission 104 Utah 318, 140 P.2d 314. This being so
this Court cannot say as a matter of law that it
was unreasonable for the Commission to have
found as a fact from all the evidence before it,
that Plaintiff's ailment was not caused by an accident and since the Commission's findings are
binding on this Court unless it can be shown as
a matter of law that they are so unreasonable as
to be arbitrary or capricious, this Court cannot
do otherwise than affirm its decision."
In a recent case, Burton vs. Industrial Commission,
13 Utah 2d 553, 374 P2d 439, this court said at page 554,
"In order to reverse the finding and order
made the Plaintiff must show that there is such
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credible uncontradicted evidence in her favor that
the Commission's refusal to so find was capricious and arbitrary."
The Court in denying the Plaintiff's claim for compensation in Kent vs. Industrial Commission 89 Utah
381, 57 P2d 724, gave an excellent summary of the
courts responsibility when asked to review a decision of
of the Industrial Commissions. At pages 384 and 385 the
Court had the following to say,
When the Industrial Commission denies compensation and the case is brought to this court
for review, a different type of search of the record
is demanded than when the Industrial Commission makes an award of compensation and the
record is likewise brought here for review.
In the denial of compensation, the record must
disclose that there is material, substantial, competent, uncontradicted evidence sufficient to make
a disregard of it justify the conclusion, as a matter of law, that the Industrial Commission arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded the evidence
or unreasonably refused to believe such evidance.*****
When we are asked to overturn the findings
and conclusions of the commission denying compensation it must be made clearly to appear that
the commission acted wholly without cause in rejecting or in refusing to believe or give effect to
the evidence. It was not intended by the Workmen's Compensation Act that this court, in matters of evidence, should to any extent substitute
the judgment of the court upon factual matters
for the judgment of the commission."
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We submit that under the statute and cases above
cited that the Industrial Commission's findings of fact
arc conclusive and final and should not be interfered
\Vi th by the Court.
CONCLUSION
\Vc submit that the Industrial Commission properly

conducted its proceedings in the matter, and from the
evidence reached the correct conclusion. The decision
and order of the Commission should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General~
CHARLES WELCH, JR.
Attorney for Defendants
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